Member of Technical Staff, Security Engineering

What you’ll work on

• Threat-model the paths from agent output to runtime, fleet, and release actions; turn findings into explicit trust boundaries, abuse cases, and prioritized engineering work.
• Build workload and service identity controls with short-lived, scoped credentials, authorization checks at downstream boundaries, and prompt revocation for compromised or retired access.
• Engineer isolation for untrusted workloads and tool integrations, with deliberate controls on filesystem, network, device, and secret access appropriate to each execution path.
• Establish secure build and deployment controls: protect source and dependency intake, preserve artifact provenance, and enforce policy checks before privileged environments accept releases.
• Develop adversarial test coverage for agent and tool misuse—including indirect instruction attacks, confused-deputy paths, privilege escalation, and attempts to escape workload boundaries—and keep the cases reproducible as regressions.
• Make privileged actions reconstructible through security-relevant audit signals, detections, and incident runbooks; partner with Fleet on operational response without taking ownership of fleet operation.

What you bring

• Hands-on platform or product security engineering experience in systems where code can trigger consequential infrastructure actions.
• Strong Linux security fundamentals and practical experience designing workload identity, service-to-service authorization, secrets handling, and least-privilege access controls.
• Experience securing isolation boundaries such as containers, virtual machines, sandboxes, or similar multi-tenant execution environments, with clear understanding of their failure modes.
• Experience hardening CI/CD and software supply chains, including dependency risk, artifact integrity or provenance, and deploy-time policy enforcement.
• Ability to threat-model agentic or automation-heavy systems and translate adversarial scenarios into testable controls rather than relying on instructions or model behavior alone.
• Practical incident-response judgment: can investigate an access-control or isolation failure from telemetry, contain it, and convert lessons into durable engineering changes.

What progress looks like

• A reviewed security architecture maps identities, trust boundaries, privileged tools, sensitive assets, and revocation paths across the agent-to-runtime flow; its open risks have named owners and tracked mitigations.
• Representative privileged actions execute through scoped identities and independently enforced authorization checks, with evidence from access tests showing that expired, over-scoped, or cross-boundary requests are denied and logged.
• A repeatable adversarial evaluation suite exercises high-risk agent and workload abuse paths, and its results inform regression tests, incident playbooks, and release criteria for the security-relevant interfaces.

Where this role fits

Owns security of who and what can act; Safety & Verification owns correctness of allowed actions.